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Abstract 
     Japanese household-level data describing a husband's earnings, his wife's working 
status, and their schooling levels are used to test the implications of a model proposing a 
time-consuming process of human capital accumulation within marriages, in which an 
educated wife is more productive.  The empirical results support the model’s 
predictions: in particular (i) a housewife's schooling has a greater positive effect on her 
husband's earnings than a working wife’s schooling does; and (ii) the effect of a 
housewife's schooling increases with the length of marriage, whereas the effect of a 
working wife’s schooling does not change over the course of marriage.  (100 words)  
 
                                                   
1 Correspondence should be addressed to the author at GRIPS/FASID Joint Graduate Program, 
7-22-1 Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo 106-8677, Japan.  E-mail address: ymano@grips.ac.jp. 
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1. Introduction 
While human capital is accumulated through each individual’s costly investment, 
such as formal education and working experience (e.g., Becker 1964; Heckman and 
Polachek 1974; Mincer 1974; Ashenfelter and Krueger 1994; Behrman, Rosenzweig, 
and Taubman 1994; Card 1999), it is also highly influenced by interaction with the 
surrounding people.  In fact, economic outcomes such as one’s earnings are often 
associated with family and community backgrounds (e.g., Behrman and Wolfe 1984; 
Boulier and Rosenzweig 1984; Hauser and Sewell 1986; Corcoran, 1992).  For 
instance, one’s earnings are positively associated with parents’ schooling (e.g., 
Heckman and Hotz 1986; Lam and Shoeni, 1993, 1994; Behrman, et al. 1999), while 
learning from neighbors can help a person increase productivity and increase income 
(Foster and Rosenzweig 1995; Conley and Udry, 2010). 
It is thus natural to expect that such human capital accumulation through social 
interaction also occurs between a husband and wife.  Benham (1974) was the first to 
argue that an educated wife improves her husband’s productivity and thus increases his 
earnings; the so-called ―cross-productivity effect within marriage‖ (see also, Scully, 
1979; Kenny, 1983; Wong, 1986; Lam and Schoeni, 1993; Jepsen 2005; Lefgren and 
McIntyre, 2006; Mano and Yamamura, 2011), which is considered to occur in addition 
to the assortative mating, picking up the effect of the unobserved husband’s ability 
(Welch, 1974; Liu and Zhang, 1999).
2
  Disentangling the cross-productivity effect 
                                                   
2
 It is widely observed that a wife’s human capital positively influences a husband’s earnings; for 
instance, in Israel (Neuman and Ziderman 1992), Iran (Scully 1979), the Philippines (Boulier and 
Rosenzweig 1984), Malaysia (Amin and Jepsen, L., 2005), and Brazil (Lam and Shoeni, 1993, 
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from the assortative mating effect has been one of the major challenges in this literature.  
Using twins data to control for the unobserved mating effect, Huang et al. (2009) find 
that cross productivity is important in explaining the earnings among Chinese 
households.  As Huang et al’s study lacks a formal model, however, their finding is not 
readily generalizable beyond the Chinese case, and, more importantly, it is not clear 
under what conditions the cross-productivity effect works.  The current paper attempts 
to better understand the mechanism underlying the cross-productivity effect by testing a 
simple model on recent Japanese household data, describing the earnings, human capital 
characteristics, and working status of the husband and wife.  
It is well established that when one’s schooling improves his/her own productivity 
and earnings, both the quantity and quality of education play important roles (Welch, 
1966; Johnson and Stafford, 1973; Behrman and Birdsall, 1983; Card and Krueger, 
1992).  The quantity of schooling is often measured by the number of years of 
schooling, while the quality of schooling could be measured by the educational level of 
the teachers.  The analogous framework should apply to the cross-productivity effect, 
in which a wife improves her husband’s productivity and earnings.  While the 
―quality‖ may be measured by a wife’s schooling in this case, the ―quantity‖ may be 
measured by the number of years of marriage and by a wife’s time dedicated to 
improving her husband’s knowledge and physical fitness.3   
                                                                                                                                                     
1994). 
3 Using U.S. census data from 1960 to 2000, Jepsen (2005) finds that a husband’s earnings increase 
with his wife’s education.  However, the magnitude of the effect declines over cohorts, and Jepsen 
conjectures that the rapid increase in a wife’s labor participation reduced her time to improve her 
husband’s productivity. 
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In fact, we find through our analysis on the Japanese household data that the 
positive effect of a housewife’s education on her husband's earnings is greater than the 
effect of a working wife’s schooling.4  Moreover, the effect of a wife’s schooling 
further increases with the number of years of marriage only in the case of a housewife, 
who has more time to improve her husband’s human capital than a working wife does.  
We also find evidence that a wife’s schooling is positively associated with at least one 
particular aspect of her husband’s human capital; that is, health.  In the analysis below, 
we will use the switching regression model to correct a possible endogeneity bias 
arising from a wife’s labor supply decision.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  In the following section we will 
extend the conceptual framework discussed here.  Section 3 contains a description of 
the dataset and some descriptive statistics.  Section 4 sets out our estimation strategy, 
while the estimation results are presented in Section 5.  Finally, Section 6 concludes 
this paper.   
 
 
2. Conceptual framework and estimation strategy 
 
2.1 Model 
A simple model will help us understand the mechanism of the cross-productivity 
                                                   
4 Using the same dataset, Mano and Yamamura (2011) investigate the relationships of a husband’s 
education to labor supply and earnings among married Japanese women.  Whereas educated 
husbands reduce the labor supply of wives, their human capital is positively associated with 
productivity and earnings of the wives once they participate in the labor market. 
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effect between the husband and wife.  Let us consider a married couple with members 
M (male) and F (female).  Each member is endowed with total available time T, and is 
characterized by schooling level s and ability  .  Given the schooling and ability of 
the household members, each member allocates time Z to improving the other 
member’s productivity and the remaining (T－Z) to labor supply, and consumes a 
private Hicksian composite consumption good in quantity C, so that the household 
utility will be maximized.  Berliant and Fujita (2009) emphasize the importance of the 
contribution of each member of a couple, especially the heterogeneity in the state of 
knowledge which each member brings into a couple, in successful joint human capital 
accumulation.  In the current setting, time Z is allocated to activities that broaden the 
knowledge of the household members (e.g., suggesting ideas and exchanging thoughts 
on certain issues) or that promote better health (e.g., preparing nutritious meals).  The 
price of the consumption good is set to one, while member M’s market wage rate wM ≡ 
w (ZF; sM, M, sF, F) is equal to the value of his marginal product of labor, which 
increases with member F’s contribution ZF, and members M and F’s schooling level s 
and ability  .  Member F’s wage rate wF is analogously defined.   
Let us formally state the household utility maximization problem.  The 
household maximizes the utility function:  
     
 
 FM
ZZCC
CCU
FMFM
,m a x
,,,
     FFMMFM wZTwZTCCts ..      
The household utility function is assumed to increase with both members’ consumption, 
and the market wage function takes a form of 
   FFFMMFFMMFM ZssssZw   1,,,;  with 0 , which captures all the 
characteristics assumed above.  In the interior solution, in which both members work 
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in the market, the optimal time allocation for productivity improvement, and the 
resulting wage rates are,
5
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In the case of a corner solution in which only member M works in the market;
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      TZM 
* , 0* FZ , and  Tssw FFMMM   1
* .  
 
2.2 Analytical results 
Let us conduct a comparative statics on member M’s wage rate and working time in the 
optimum.  The derivative of member M’s optimal wage rate with respect to his own 
education is always positive;   021*  Tssw FFMMM   in the interior 
solution, and   01*  Tssw FFMMM  in the corner solution where only member 
M works in the market.  These results imply that:  
 
Lemma 1 (Own education on wage rate)  The wage rate of household member M 
increases with his own schooling. 
                                                   
5 Comparing the total household earnings, we find that the parametric condition for the interior 
solution, in which both members work in the market, to be chosen over the corner solutions, in 
which either member does not work in the market, is  
  FFMMFFMMFFMMFFMM ssTssTssss   22 222222222 . 
6 The parametric condition for the corner solution in which only member M works is  
   FFMMFFMMFFMMFFMM ssTssTssss   22 222222222 . 
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We can also examine the association of one’s productivity and earnings with 
the spouse’s schooling, by taking the derivative with respect to spouse F’s education; 
02*  Tssw FMMFM   in the interior solution, and 0
*  Tssw FMMFM   
in the corner solution, which imply that  
 
Lemma 2 (Cross-productivity effect)  The wage rate of member M increases with 
member F’s educational level.   
 
We will examine the following hypothesis in the empirical analysis below:     
 
     Hypothesis 1:  A husband’s earnings are positively associated with his wife’s 
schooling. 
 
Even if there is no cross-productivity effect, however, we may still observe a 
positive correlation between a wife’s educational level with her husband’s wage rate.  
For the sake of argument, consider the case in which there is no cross productivity effect 
(i.e., 0 ).  In this case, member M’s marginal productivity is determined solely by 
his own schooling and ability as MMM sw 
* .  Suppose, furthermore, that the 
well-educated tend to marry people with high ability as well as education; i.e., 
  0ln,lncov MFs  .  The covariance between the logarithm of M’s wage rate and the 
logarithm of member F’s schooling conditional on M’s own schooling 
is    
MM
SMFS
MF sws ln,lncovln,lncov
*  , which is positive by assumption.  This is 
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the so-called assortative mating effect. 
 
Lemma 3 (Assortative mating)  Suppose there is no cross productivity effect (i.e., 
0 ).  Suppose also that the well-educated tend to marry people with higher ability; 
i.e.,   0ln,lncov 
Ms
MFs  .  We observe a positive correlation between a wife’s 
schooling with her husband’s wage rate conditional on his own schooling. 
 
Therefore, member M’s wage rate can be positively associated with his wife’s 
schooling either due to the cross-productivity effect or due to the assortative mating 
effect.  Further analysis of the model will provide an identification strategy.  The idea 
is that the assortative mating effect does not change with the length of marriage, 
whereas the cross-productivity effect is expected to increase with the length of marriage.  
To see this, take a derivative of the cross productivity effect  FM sw  *  with respect to 
length of marriage T, and we obtain   02*2  FMMFM sTsw   in the interior 
solution, and   0*2  FMMFM sTsw   in the corner solution.  By contrast, 
suppose that there is no cross-productivity effect ( 0 ) but assortative mating; i.e., 
  0ln,lncov 
Ms
MFs  .  As ability here is inherently given and does not change over 
the course of life, a change in this assortative mating effect with the length of marriage 
is expected to be nil.   
 
Lemma 4 (The length of marriage)  The assortative mating effect does not change 
with the length of marriage, whereas the cross-productivity effect increases with the 
length of marriage. 
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Based on this identification strategy in Lemma 4, we will postulate the following 
hypothesis.   
 
     Hypothesis 2:  The positive association between a husband’s earnings and his 
wife’s schooling increases with the length of marriage. 
 
Furthermore, we can obtain the main proposition of the current paper, by 
comparing the partial derivatives of member M’s wage rate with respect to member M’s 
schooling, and with respect to member F’s schooling, respectively, between the interior 
solution and the corner solution.   
 
Proposition 5 (Working wife and housewife)  The effects on member M’s wage rate 
of his own schooling and member F’s schooling are both greater in the corner solution 
than in the interior solution. 
 
Proposition 5 leads us to the following hypothesis. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  The positive associations between a husband’s earnings and his 
own and his wife’s schooling are greater for couples with a housewife than for 
couples with a working wife. 
 
We will describe how to test these hypotheses on our data. 
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2.3 Estimation strategy 
Based on the conceptual framework advanced in the previous subsection, we 
will empirically examine the cross-productivity effect within marriage, and particularly 
compare the effect between a housewife and a working wife.  To control for the 
endogeneity of a wife’s labor force participation, we will rely on the Type 5 Tobit 
method to estimate the switching regression model (Amemiya, 1985). 
 
Labor participation equation 
Mincer (1962) has triggered a large number of studies on the labor supply of 
married women; it is now well understood that their labor force participation is 
determined by their own human capital characteristics and their diverse socio-economic 
environments.
7
  The first equation models the labor supply decision among married 
women, which can be expressed as follows: 
 
   y1i
*
 = xi’1 + zi’β + u1i, for i = 1, …, n,                        (I) 
 
where it is assumed that only the sign of y1i
*
 is observed, it is positive if and only if 
married woman i participates in the labor market, and n denotes the number of 
observations.  The first vector of explanatory variables, xi, consists of years of own and 
spousal schooling, own and spousal ages and their squared terms, size dummies for the 
city of residence, and year dummies.  We expect that an educated wife, expecting a 
higher market wage, is more likely to participate in the labor market, while an educated 
                                                   
7
 For an overview of labor supply among women, see Killingsworth and Heckman (1986) and 
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999). 
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husband receives higher earnings and allows his wife to stay at home, which can be 
considered as a division of labor within a household (Becker, 1991; Devereux, 2004; 
Kalenkoski et al., 2009).   
This labor supply model incorporates another set of explanatory variables, zi, 
consisting of the number of children under age six, which supposedly measures the 
burden of childcare, and four dummy variables, each indicating co-residence with own 
or spousal fathers and mothers, respectively.  Childcare is time-consuming and takes 
up much of the mother’s time, especially when the children are young.  In consequence, 
we expect that married women with more young children tend to stay at home and not 
participate in the labor force (Ribar, 1992, 1995; Angrist and Evans, 1998).   
Furthermore, we also expect to observe positive effects of co-residence with the 
mother or the mother-in-law on the wife’s labor force participation; these effects will be 
compared with the corresponding effects of co-residence with the father or the 
father-in-law.  Existing studies only look at the effects of co-residence with one’s 
parents and in-laws as a whole (Hill, 1983; Yamada, Yamada, and Chaloupka, 1987; 
Ogawa and Ermisch, 1996; Sasaki, 2002).  However, it is reasonable to expect that the 
effects on the labor supply of co-residence with one’s own or spousal mother will be 
different from the effects of co-residence with one’s own or spousal father.  In many 
societies, women are responsible for a greater portion of the housework (Becker, 1991); 
this is the case in the traditional sexual division of labor in a Japanese household (Juster 
and Stafford, 1991; Kamo, 1991; Hakim, 1996; Strober and Chan, 1998).  In general, 
wives tend to shoulder most of the housework and childcare, thereby accumulating the 
human capital specifically useful for these tasks.  Therefore, own or spousal mothers 
are more able to facilitate their married daughters or daughters-in-law in working in the 
12 
 
market by reducing their burden of household work; own or spousal fathers do not 
usually share housework and thus they are less able to affect the labor supply of 
daughters or daughters-in-law.   
  This second set of explanatory variables, zi, will be excluded from the 
husband’s earnings equation.  This identification strategy is based on the assumption 
that these factors do not directly affect the husband’s productivity and earnings in the 
labor market.  However, a husband making greater earnings may choose to have more 
children or tend to accommodate his own and spousal parents.
8
  Based on these 
considerations, we alternatively estimate the system of equations dropping these 
variables as a robustness check.  Notice that even without the exclusion restrictions we 
can still rely on the non-linearity of the probit model as an identification strategy. 
 
Earnings equation 
The husband’s earnings equation can be expressed as:  
 
   y2i
*
 = xi’2 + u2i, for i = 1, …, n,                                  (II) 
 
where y2i
* 
is the logarithm of husband’s earnings, {u1i, u2i} are i.i.d. drawings from a 
bivariate normal distribution, and the vector of explanatory variables xi is the same as in 
                                                   
8
 Sasaki (2002) addresses the endogeneity of family structure, in which a married woman may 
choose to co-reside with parents or with in-laws in an attempt to reduce her housework and to 
consequently participate in the labor force.  His results suggest that the effect of co-residence with 
parents or in-laws on the labor supply of married women only marginally changes when the 
endogeneity of family structure is addressed by the instrumental variable method.   
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the labor force participation model expressed by equation (I).  In addition to analyzing 
the effect of a husband’s education on his labor earnings (Lemma 1), our main focus 
here is to examine the effect of his wife’s years of schooling on his earnings (Lemma 2).  
We will thus examine Hypothesis 1, which states that a husband’s earnings are 
positively associated with his wife’s education.      
As we discussed in Subsection 2.2, a husband’s wage rate can be positively 
associated with his wife’s schooling either due to the cross-productivity effect or due to 
the assortative mating effect.  We will test Hypothesis 2, which states that the positive 
association between a husband's earnings and his wife’s schooling is reinforced with the 
length of marriage, in an attempt to establish that the cross-productivity effect at least 
partly explains the positive association between a husband’s earnings and his wife’s 
education.  More importantly, we will compare the effects of his own and his wife’s 
schooling on a husband’s earnings between the working wife sample and the housewife 
sample in order to see whether the evidence supports Hypothesis 3, which states that the 
positive associations between a husband’s earnings and his own and his wife’s 
schooling are greater for households with a housewife than for households with a 
working wife.    
The next section will describe the dataset in detail, and basic statistics will 
document the situation of a wife’s labor supply and a husband’s earnings in Japan.   
 
 
3.  Data and descriptive statistics 
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This paper uses Japanese General Social Survey (hereafter, JGSS) data.
9
  These 
surveys adopted a two-step stratified sampling method and were conducted throughout 
Japan between 2000 and 2002.  They asked standard questions about an individual and 
his/her family characteristics through face-to-face interviews.  These data included 
information on marital and demographic (such as age and gender) status, annual 
earnings, years of schooling, age, and size of residential area.  Importantly, the 
spouses’ socioeconomic information was also collected and made available for analysis.  
Table 1 presents the average characteristics of the sampled married couples in 
our study by the labor participation status of the wife; the number of observations—that 
is, the size of the sample of married couples—is 3500.  The average husband with a 
working wife earned over 5.6 million yen (or around 56 thousand USD), while the 
average husband with a housewife earned 5.8 million yen (or 58 thousand USD), where 
the difference is not statistically significant.  We can observe the annual earnings only 
for working wives; their average earnings are 2 million yen (or 20 thousand USD).
10
  
The average working wife and housewife are remarkably similar to each other in terms 
of their human capital characteristics, and they are around 46 years old and, more 
importantly, have 12.3 years of schooling.  In Japan, compulsory education consists of 
                                                   
9
 Data for this secondary analysis, ―Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), Ichiro Tanioka,‖ were 
provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for Social Science Research 
on Japan, Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo. 
10
 In the original dataset, annual earnings are grouped into 19 categories; we assumed that everyone 
in each category earned the midpoint value.  For the top category of ―23 million yen and above,‖ 
we assumed that everybody earned 23 million yen.  Since only a single observation was in this 
category, the top-coding problem should not be serious.  
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six years of primary schooling and three years of junior-high, which is followed by 
three years of high school and four years of college education.  As we have discussed 
above, while an educated wife is more likely to participate in the labor market on one 
hand, her husband tends to receive relatively higher earnings due to the cross 
productivity effect or the assortative mating effect and thus allow her to stay at home on 
the other hand.  On average, these two forces seem to offset each other.  As for a 
husband’s human capital characteristics, we find that a housewife’s husband is 
significantly younger and more educated than a working wife’s husband.  This higher 
educational level may, at least partly, explain why a housewife’s husband tends to make 
relatively higher, though not statistically significant, earnings than a working wife’s 
husband.  We will conduct the regression analysis below to disentangle the 
cross-productivity effect from these other determinants of a husband’s earnings. 
 The household characteristics are also consistent with the discussion above.  
A housewife tends to have more children under age six than a working wife.  
Furthermore, a working wife tends to reside with her own mother and her husband’s 
parents more often than a housewife does.  Moreover, a married couple tends to live 
with the husband’s parents more often than with the wife’s parents, reflecting the 
traditional family structure in Japan.  Overall, these observations are consistent with 
the results of Ogawa and Ermisch (1996), which used a survey conducted by the 
Mainichi newspapers in June 1990, and of Sasaki (2002), which used another Japanese 
micro-level dataset, the Panel Study on Consumption and Living, 1993 (Shohi Seikatsu 
ni kansusru Paneru Chousa), conducted by the Institute for Household Economy (Kakei 
Keizai Kenkyujo).  This indicates the representativeness of our dataset and of the 
following analysis of the husband’s earnings in Japan.    
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Health is another important aspect of human capital, besides knowledge 
(Schultz, 1961; Schultz, 2002).  Table 1 also presents a husband’s health status 
assessed by himself and his wife, respectively, in five grades, ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 
(good).  The comparison between the working wife sample and the housewife sample 
suggests that a husband married to a housewife tends to be in a better state of health 
according to both his own and his wife’s assessments, but the differences are not 
statistically significant. 
Table 2 presents this assessment on a husband’s health status by wife’s labor 
participation and schooling.  The education levels are divided into two groups, 12 
years or less of schooling and 13 years or more.
11
  In three out of the four cases, the 
husband’s health condition is significantly higher among the couples with more 
educated wives, while the difference is not statistically significant in the remaining case.  
In particular, among the housewife sample, a husband’s health condition is always 
significantly better among couples with a more educated wife than with a less educated 
wife.  It is well established in the literature that a husband in a better state of health 
tends to perform better at work and make higher earnings (Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Hassan, 
1990; Thomas and Strauss, 1997; Strauss and Thomas, 1998), and it may also be 
reasonable to assume that a wife attempts to improve her husband’s health condition, 
motivated by this consideration in addition to many others.  In particular, an educated 
housewife may have sufficient time to implement her better knowledge about a 
balanced diet and a healthy lifestyle, and successfully improve her husband’s fitness.   
We actually observe that a husband’s earnings tend to be positively associated 
                                                   
11 Alternatively, we divided the sample between a wife with 12 years or less of schooling and 13 
years or more.  The results were essentially the same as the one reported here. 
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with his wife’s education (Table 3), which renders support to our Hypothesis 1.  The 
upper panel in Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the working wife sample, 
while the lower panel presents the corresponding statistics for the housewife sample.  
Column (1) in Table 3 presents the labor earnings of a husband married to a wife with 
12 years or less of schooling, while Column (2) presents the labor earnings of a husband 
married to a wife with 13 years or more of schooling.  Similarly, Rows (i) and (iii) 
present the labor earnings of a husband with 12 years or less of schooling, while Row 
(ii) and (iv) present the labor earnings of a husband with 13 or more of schooling.  
Among the working wife sample with her husband with 12 years or less of schooling 
(Row i in Table 3), his annual earnings are 5.04 million yen when his wife has 12 years 
or less of education, while he annually earns 5.90 million yen when his wife has 13 
years or more of schooling.  The corresponding difference is not statistically 
significant for the working wife sample with a husband with 13 years or more of 
schooling (Row ii) between Columns (1) and (2).  Among the housewife sample (the 
lower panel of Table 3), a husband’s earnings are significantly higher when his wife has 
13 years or more of schooling (Column 2) than when she has 12 years or less of 
schooling (Column 1), regardless of the husband’s educational level.  This appears to 
suggest that a housewife’s education has a greater positive effect on her husband’s 
earnings than a working wife’s education, which is congruent to our Hypothesis 3. 
 
 
4.  Estimation results 
To see the importance of controlling for a married woman’s self-selection into the 
labor force, we simply estimate the earnings equation (II) by using OLS.  Columns (1), 
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(2), and (3) of Table 4 present a husband’s earnings equations for the working wife 
sample, and Columns (4), (5), and (6) for the housewife sample.  We begin our 
analysis with the simplest specification of the earnings equations presented in Columns 
(1) and (4), in which the explanatory variables include a husband’s own education, his 
age as a proxy for experience, and its squared term.  An additional year of a husband’s 
schooling increases his own earnings by 5.5 percentage points among the working wife 
sample (Column 1), whereas among the housewife sample an additional year of his 
schooling increases his earnings even more significantly by 8.7 percentage points 
(Column 4).  This estimation result is in line with Hypothesis 3. 
When we additionally include a wife’s schooling as an explanatory variable, the 
estimated effect of an additional year of her schooling on her husband’s earnings is 4.5 
percentage points in the working wife sample (Column 2), while it is 4.1 percentage 
points in the housewife sample (Column 4).  These results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 1.  When a wife’s schooling is controlled for, the estimated effect of a 
husband’s own schooling declines from 5.5 percentage points in Column (1) to 3.6 
percentage points in Column (2) in the working wife sample, while the effect declines 
from 8.7 percentage points in Column (4) to 7.0 percentage points in Column (5) in the 
housewife sample, due to the alleviation of the omitted variable bias arising from the 
positive correlation between a husband’s and his wife’s schooling.  Furthermore, when 
we additionally include the interaction term of a wife’s education with the years of 
marriage as an explanatory variable, the estimated effect of this interaction term is 
significantly positive (Columns 3 and 6), which renders support to Hypothesis 2.  The 
estimated coefficients also imply that the effect of a husband’s own schooling is greater 
among the housewife sample (Columns 4, 5, and 6) than among the working wife 
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sample, which is partially in line with Hypothesis 3.  We will next attempt to address 
the possible endogeneity in a wife’s labor force participation and to mitigate an 
associated bias by way of the switching regression.  
Table 5 presents the estimated model of a husband’s earnings and his wife’s labor 
participation described by the system of equations (I) and (II).  The husband’s earnings 
equation in Model A includes a wife’s schooling as well as a husband’s schooling, his 
age, and its squared term among the explanatory variables, while Model B additionally 
includes the interaction term of a wife’s schooling with the years of marriage.  The 
wife’s labor supply equation also includes her age and its squared term, the number of 
children under age 6, the dummy variables indicating whether a husband’s parents and 
his wife’s parents co-reside with the married couple (Columns A-1 and B-1).  The 
estimation result of the wife’s labor participation equation (I) suggests that a husband’s 
education significantly decreases his wife’s labor supply (Columns A-1 and B-1), while 
the tendency of an educated wife to participate in the labor market increases with the 
years of marriage (Column B-1).  A wife’s labor supply initially increases with her age 
but it starts to decline beyond a certain threshold age.  More importantly, a wife is less 
likely to participate in the labor market when she has more children under age six, 
which is consistent with the existing studies (Ribar, 1992, 1995; Angrist and Evans, 
1998).  The estimation result also provides remarkable evidence that co-residence with 
a husband’s mother increases his wife’s labor supply, while co-residence with a wife’s 
mother increases it even more significantly.  By contrast, co-residence with a wife’s 
father or her father-in-law does not have any significant effect on her labor participation, 
which is consistent with the previous studies on the Japanese family structure (Juster 
and Stafford, 1991; Kamo, 1994; Hakim, 1996; Strober and Chan, 1998).   
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The bottom of Table 5 indicates that rho_1, the correlation coefficient between 
the error terms in a wife’s labor participation equation and in her husband’s earnings 
equation in the working wife sample, is significantly negative, while the corresponding 
correlation coefficient in the housewife sample rho_2 is also significantly negative.  
These results imply that a wife’s labor supply decision is endogenous, and this justifies 
our estimation strategy by using the switching model.    
In the husband’s earnings equation (Columns A-2, A-3, B-2, and B-3), a 
husband’s own schooling has a significantly positive effect on his earnings, and the 
estimated effect tends to be greater in the housewife sample (Columns A-3 and B-3) 
than in the working wife sample (Columns A-2 and B-2).  When we drop the number 
of children under age six and the coresidence variables from the equation system as a 
robustness check, the results hardly change (Table 6).  The difference in the effect of a 
husband’s schooling seems to reflect that a housewife can spend more time to help her 
husband maintain his best health than a working wife does, so that he is able to give his 
best performance at work.  This result is consistent with Hypothesis 3. 
 The effect of his wife’s schooling on a husband’s earnings is also significantly 
positive in the three cases (Columns A-2, A-3, and B-3), which is consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, with the exception of Column (B-2).  Furthermore, the effect of a wife’s 
schooling is greater and more highly statistically significant in the housewife sample 
(Columns A-3 and B-3) than in the working wife sample (Columns A-2 and B-2).  In 
Table 6, a wife’s years of schooling has a significantly positive effect in the housewife 
sample (Columns C-3 and D-3), whereas it is insignificant in the working wife sample 
(Columns C-3 and D-3).  One reasonable way to interpret this result is that as a 
housewife can usually spend more time to help her husband improve his human capital, 
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perhaps through discussion and the provision of useful advice regarding his work, than 
a working wife does, her schooling level makes a greater difference in affecting her 
husband’s earnings.  These results render support to Hypothesis 3.  In sum, these 
findings indicate that an educated wife is better at improving her husband’s productivity, 
while the productivity of an educated husband improves more substantially with his 
wife’s dedicated support. 
Furthermore, the interaction term of a wife’s schooling with the years of 
marriage has a statistically significantly positive coefficient only in the housewife 
sample (Column B-3).  Thus, the effect of a housewife’s schooling on her husband’s 
earnings increases with the years of marriage, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2.  
By contrast, this interaction term is not statistically significant in the working wife 
sample (Column B-2), which means that the effect of a working wife’s schooling on her 
husband’s earnings does not significantly change with the years of marriage.  We also 
obtain the same results in Table 6.  In all likelihood, a working wife has less time to 
help her husband improve his human capital than a housewife does, and, thus, the 
―cumulative‖ cross productivity effect is also significantly weaker in the working wife 
sample than in the housewife sample
12
.   
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
The existing literature provides substantial evidence on human capital 
accumulation through social interactions.  However, due primarily to the lack of data, 
                                                   
12
 We are assuming here that a working wife has been working most of her married life, whereas a 
housewife has rarely worked.  We do not have data to confirm this argument directly.  
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the underlying mechanism has not been sufficiently understood, even for one of the 
smallest social units, a married couple.  Thus, this paper attempted to reveal the nature 
of human capital accumulation through interaction between a husband and wife by 
testing a simple model on recent household-level data from Japan.   
Our model describes human capital accumulation within a marriage as a 
time-consuming process, in which an educated wife is more productive, and it predicts 
that: (1) a husband’s earnings increase with his wife’s schooling; (2) this positive effect 
of a wife’s schooling further increases with the length of marriage, which is not 
predicted by the alternative assortative mating hypothesis; and (3) the effects on a 
husband’s earnings of his own and his wife’s schooling are both greater in the 
housewife sample than in the working wife sample.  We used the switching regression 
model to address the endogeneity in a wife’s labor participation decision, and obtained 
the supportive evidence for these predictions. 
Specifically, the regression results suggest that an educated wife is likely to 
improve her husband’s human capital more effectively.  Consistently, the descriptive 
analysis finds that a husband’s health human capital tends to increase with his wife’s 
educational level.  In all likelihood, her schooling similarly improves the other aspects 
of her husband’s human capital.  In these situations it is reasonable to expect that this 
positive effect of a wife’s schooling increases with the amount of time that she spends to 
improve her husband’s human capital.  In fact, an educated housewife increases her 
husband’s earnings more substantially than a similarly educated working wife does.  
Furthermore, the magnitude of the positive effect of a housewife’s schooling on her 
husband’s earnings increases with the years of marriage, whereas the magnitude of the 
corresponding effect of a working wife’s schooling does not significantly change with 
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the years of marriage.  These findings indicate the importance of education in human 
capital accumulation within a marriage, which is often neglected in the discussion of the 
division of labor between a husband and wife.  
 Overall, our model of human capital accumulation within a marriage and the 
associated supportive empirical evidence extend our understanding of the nature of 
human capital accumulation through social interaction.  More detailed information 
about household activities, such as more detailed data on time allocation within 
households, nutritional intake, and more objective health indicators, would certainly 
allow us to examine this issue more closely.  It is highly beneficial to combine these 
attempts to reveal the underlying mechanism of human capital accumulation through 
social interactions with such ideal data sets, such as the twins data used in Huang et al. 
(2009), allowing cleaner identification.  These are the remaining challenges to be 
addressed in a future study.     
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Table 1.  Average Characteristics of the Sample Married Couples by Wife’s Labor Participation. 
 Working wife Housewife p-value for t-test with 
 (1) (2) H0: (1) - (2) = 0  
Annual earnings     
Husband (million yen) 5.65 5.83 0.121 
Wife 2.03 --- --- 
    
Human capital characteristics    
Husband’s age 49.6 48.8 0.057* 
Wife’s age 46.9 46.3 0.144 
Husband’s years of schooling 12.7 13.0 0.0003*** 
Wife’s years of schooling 12.3 12.3 0.803 
    
Household characteristics    
Years of marriage 22.6 21.4 0.008*** 
No. of children aged under 6 0.14 0.38 0.000*** 
Coresidence with husband’s mother 20.2 14.0 0.000*** 
Coresidence with husband’s father 11.0 8.4 0.014** 
Coresidence with wife’s mother (%)  5.7 3.3 0.001*** 
Coresidence with wife’s father 2.8 2.1 0.181 
    
Husband’s health    
Husband’s assessment 3.43 3.50 0.231 
Wife’s assessment 3.87 3.90 0.525 
No. obs. 1862 1638 --- 
Notes.  The unit of annual earnings is million yen.  Husband’s health is assessed in five grades, 
ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 (good).  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 
per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 2.  Husband’s Health Status by Wife’s Labor Participation and Schooling. 
 Working wife p-value for Housewife p-value for  
 Wife’s years of schooling: for t-test with Wife’s years of schooling: t-test with 
 12 or less 
(1) 
13 or more  
(2) 
H0: (1) - (2) = 0  12 or less 
(3) 
13 or more  
(4) 
H0: (3) - (4) = 0  
Husband’s health       
Husband’s assessment 3.39 3.55 0.058* 3.45 3.59 0.093* 
Wife’s assessment 3.90 3.87 0.525 3.83 3.95 0.089* 
Notes.  The assessment is in five grades, ranging from 1 (poor) to 5 (good).  In Japan, compulsory education consists of six years of primary schooling 
and three years of junior-high.  Three years of high school education and four years of college education often follow that.  *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3. Husband’s annual earnings by wife’s labor participation and couple’s years of schooling (in million yen). 
  Wife: 12 years or less Wife: 13 years or more p-value for t-test with 
  (1) (2) H0: (1) - (2) = 0  
Working wife     
Husband: 12 years or less (i) 5.04 5.90 0.000*** 
  (n=1092) (n=168)  
Husband: 13 years or more (ii) 6.48 6.84 0.169 
  (n=242) (n=360)  
p-value for t-test with      
H0: (i) - (ii) = 0  0.000*** 0.001***  
Housewife     
Husband: 12 years or less (iii) 4.55 5.82 0.000*** 
  (n=850) (n=116)  
Husband: 13 years or more (iv) 6.57 8.01 0.000*** 
  (n=262) (n=410)  
p-value for t-test with      
H0: (iii) - (iv) = 0  0.000*** 0.000***  
Note.  The number of total observations is 3500.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4.  Estimated models of the log of a husband’s annual earnings by his wife’s labor participation status. (OLS) 
 Working wife Housewife 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Husband’s years of schooling 0.055*** 0.036*** 0.038*** 0.087*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 
 (8.36) (4.88) (5.33) (14.14) (10.01) (10.01) 
Wife’s years of schooling --- 0.045*** 0.020* --- 0.041*** 0.025*** 
 (---) (4.38) (1.91) (---) (3.98) (2.60) 
(Wife’s schooling)×(Years of marriage) --- --- 0.001*** --- --- 0.0007*** 
 (---) (---) (3.70) (---) (---) (2.73) 
Husband’s age 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.125*** 0.151*** 0.148*** 0.138*** 
 (11.82) (11.88) (10.10) (16.90) (16.38) (15.37) 
Husband’s age squared -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
 (-11.45) (-11.33) (-11.20) (-16.62) (-15.86) (-15.46) 
Constant 2.403*** 2.065*** 2.731*** 1.900*** 1.651*** 2.086*** 
 (9.05) (7.65) (9.02) (9.33) (7.76) (10.07) 
R-squared 0.223 0.233 0.243 0.412 0.419 0.417 
Notes.  The number of husbands with working wives is 1862, while the number of husbands with housewives is 1638.  Numbers in parentheses are 
t-statistics obtained by robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively.  Although not 
reported here, large and medium-sized city, and year dummies are also controlled for.   
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Table 5.  Estimated endogenous switching models of husband’s earnings (FIML). 
 Model A Model B 
 First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
 Wife’s labor participation Log of husband’s earnings Wife’s labor participation Log of husband’s earnings 
  
(A-1) 
Working wife 
(A-2) 
Housewife 
(A-3) 
 
(B-1) 
Working wife 
(B-2) 
Housewife 
(B-3) 
Husband’s years of schooling -0.054*** 0.063*** 0.073*** -0.053*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 
 (-5.06) (7.40) (9.67) (-5.00) (7.69) (9.61) 
Wife’s years of schooling 0.021 0.026** 0.039*** -0.008 0.015 0.026** 
 (1.49) (2.36) (3.93) (-0.54) (1.22) (2.35) 
(Wife’s schooling)×(Years of marriage) --- --- --- 0.001*** 0.0004 0.0006*** 
 (---) (---) (---) (3.49) (1.46) (2.61) 
Husband’s age 0.028 0.053*** 0.140*** 0.035 0.047*** 0.132*** 
 (1.28) (4.94) (15.73) (1.59) (4.21) (14.62) 
Husband’s age squared -0.0001 -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.0003 -0.0005*** -0.001*** 
 (-0.90) (-4.98) (-16.87) (-1.42) (-5.01) (-16.80) 
Wife’s age 0.054** --- --- 0.023 --- --- 
 (2.48) (---) (---) (1.05) (---) (---) 
Wife’s age squared -0.0007*** --- --- -0.0005** --- --- 
 (-3.04) (---) (---) (-2.18) (---) (---) 
Number of children under age 6 -0.364*** --- --- -0.348*** --- --- 
 (-9.46) (---) (---) (-9.17) (---) (---) 
Living with wife’s mother 0.264*** --- --- 0.236** --- --- 
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 (2.59) (---) (---) (2.34) (---) (---) 
Living with wife’s father -0.164 --- --- -0.166 --- --- 
 (-1.22) (---) (---) (-1.25) (---) (---) 
Living with husband’s mother 0.092* --- --- 0.080 --- --- 
 (1.76) (---) (---) (1.55) (---) (---) 
Living with husband’s father 0.020 --- --- 0.011 --- --- 
 (0.30) (---) (---) (0.17) (---) (---) 
Constant -1.329*** 4.448*** 1.736*** -0.403 4.692*** 2.106*** 
 (-3.83) (15.46) (8.61) (-0.95) (14.00) (8.79) 
Self-selection bias for the working wife 
(rho_1) 
-0.922*** 
(-76.8) 
--- --- -0.925*** 
(-84.09) 
--- --- 
Self-selection bias for the housewife 
(rho_2) 
-0.211* 
(-1.86) 
--- --- -0.183 
(-1.57) 
--- --- 
Log likelihood -5274.9 --- --- -5226.32 --- --- 
p-value for Wald test 0.000*** --- --- 0.000*** --- --- 
Notes.  The number of husbands with working wives is 1862, while the number of husbands with housewives is 1638.  Numbers in parentheses are 
z-statistics obtained by robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively.  Although not 
reported here, large and medium-sized city, and year dummies are also controlled for.   
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Table 6.  Estimated endogenous switching models of husband’s earnings (FIML). 
 Model C Model D 
 First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
 Wife’s labor participation Log of husband’s earnings Wife’s labor participation Log of husband’s earnings 
  
(C-1) 
Working wife 
(C-2) 
Housewife 
(C-3) 
 
(D-1) 
Working wife 
(D-2) 
Housewife 
(D-3) 
Husband’s years of schooling -0.057*** 0.067*** 0.135*** -0.051*** 0.067*** 0.074*** 
 (-5.81) (8.05) (6.83) (-4.81) (7.80) (9.61) 
Wife’s years of schooling 0.052*** 0.014 0.050* -0.016 0.017 0.025** 
 (3.95) (1.29) (1.90) (-0.98) (1.31) (2.31) 
(Wife’s schooling)×(Years of marriage) --- --- --- 0.001*** 0.0003 0.0006** 
 (---) (---) (---) (4.25) (1.14) (2.48) 
Husband’s age -0.021* 0.050*** -0.011 0.049** 0.038*** 0.130*** 
 (-1.86) (4.94) (-0.52) (2.30) (3.33) (14.16) 
Husband’s age squared -0.0001 -0.0005*** -0.0001 -0.0004** -0.0004*** -0.001*** 
 (-0.81) (-4.42) (-0.60) (-2.05) (-4.04) (-16.24) 
Wife’s age 0.177*** --- --- 0.044** --- --- 
 (22.35) (---) (---) (2.04) (---) (---) 
Wife’s age squared -0.001*** --- --- -0.0006** --- --- 
 (-19.95) (---) (---) (-3.06) (---) (---) 
Constant -3.315*** 4.542*** 3.107*** -1.394*** 4.911*** 2.106*** 
 (-11.57) (15.78) (5.56) (-3.43) (14.44) (8.74) 
Self-selection bias for the working wife -0.883*** --- --- -0.936*** --- --- 
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(rho_1) (-51.9) (-103.07) 
Self-selection bias for the housewife 
(rho_2) 
-0.999 
(---) 
--- --- -0.255* 
(-1.94) 
--- --- 
Log likelihood -6359.3 --- --- -5277.73 --- --- 
p-value for Wald test 0.000*** --- --- 0.000*** --- --- 
Notes.  The number of husbands with working wives is 1862, while the number of husbands with housewives is 1638.  Numbers in parentheses are 
z-statistics obtained by robust standard errors. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 per cent levels, respectively.  Although not 
reported here, large and medium-sized city, and year dummies are also controlled for.    
